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. Introduction
During the very months in which Kant was writing the Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, he was also lecturing on legal and political theory.
The moral theory developed in the Groundwork is replete with legal
terminology and political analogies. Few interpreters, however, have
explored the extent to which these lectures, known as the Feyerabend
Lectures on Natural Law, shed light on core elements of Kant’s moral
theory. In this essay, I focus on the notion of autonomy and argue that
these lectures shed new light on the meaning of this core concept of Kant’s
ethics.
The introduction of the idea of autonomy is one of the most important
philosophical innovations of the Groundwork. Its signiﬁcance is indisput-
able. Kant designates autonomy as the “principle of morality,” calls one of
the versions of the Categorical Imperative the “Principle of Autonomy,”
identiﬁes autonomy with freedom of the will, and argues that conceiving
of morality in terms of autonomy is the only way to account for the
unconditionality of moral obligation. Clearly, an idea that plays all of these
roles is hugely important – yet how the idea of autonomy plays these roles
is a matter of much dispute, and many commentators argue that Kant’s
arguments are ultimately unsuccessful.
 Several interpreters note that Kant introduces autonomy as an analogy, and some elaborate the
political analogy in more detail (e.g., O’Neill :–; Reath :–; Korsgaard
:–). They do so by drawing on Rousseau, on their own understanding of political
self-legislation, or on Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. The political theory that Kant defended while he
was writing the Groundwork, however, is a much more appropriate point of reference than the
conceptions of others (such as one’s own or Rousseau’s). Furthermore, the Metaphysics of Morals is
not a reliable guide to Kant’s  understanding of autonomy, since Kant’s political theory
underwent profound changes during the intervening period. Kant even seems to drop the
Principle of Autonomy in the s (see Kleingeld ).

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Kant’s concept of autonomy does indeed raise many diﬃcult questions.
On the face of it, the notion of autonomy – or “self-legislation” – seems
to be a rather infelicitous metaphor, if not a deeply incoherent idea. The
notion tends to invite voluntaristic misunderstandings, since “legislating”
or “lawgiving” generally means enacting a law that was not in force until
that very moment. Speaking of “self-legislation” or “autonomy” in relation
to morality and the will may therefore evoke the idea that one puts oneself
under moral obligation by an act of will. This in turn seems to suggest
that one can repeal the law or enact a diﬀerent law if one wants to. Yet it is
clear that Kant regarded neither the validity nor the content of the highest
moral principle as being up to the agent. As a result, many authors
consider Kant’s conception of moral autonomy paradoxical and deeply
problematic, or at least in need of careful qualiﬁcation.
We might therefore wonder why Kant made the notion of autonomy
central to his moral theory in the ﬁrst place. He certainly does not argue
that particular agents decide at some point in time to enact the Categorical
Imperative, speciﬁc moral laws, or both. But then, what does “autonomy”
mean, and how could Kant possibly have considered the idea of autonomy
apt for expressing the principle of morality? These are the main questions
I address in this essay.
I shall take as my point of departure Kant’s statement that the diﬀerent
formulas that follow his articulation of the Formula of Universal Law each
involve the use of “a certain analogy,” and that they are diﬀerent ways “to
represent the principle of morality” (G :, emphasis added; also ).
The ﬁrst is the Formula of the Law of Nature, the second is the Formula of
 In Greek, the adjective αὐτόνομος, which derives from the words for “self” and “law,” means
“independent” or “living under one’s own laws.” It should also be noted that Kant himself does
not use the German counterpart of the English noun “self-legislation” (“Selbstgesetzgebung”).
 For further explanations of the interpretive diﬃculties, see, e.g., Reath : chapter ; Wood :
chapter ; Ameriks ; Sensen a:–.
 According to one important tradition of interpretation, Kant indeed claims that we impose moral
obligation on ourselves. To quote just one representative statement, from Jerome Schneewind:
“[Kant] held that we are self-governing because we are autonomous. By this he meant that we
ourselves legislate the moral law” and that we “impose morality on ourselves” (Schneewind :
and ).
 Pinkard :; Wood :–.
 For example, Onora O’Neill emphasizes that the “self” of which Kant speaks should not be
understood as referring to a particular individual, but rather to an “impersonal” self qua rational
being. She rightly emphasizes that Kant asserts that the moral criterion is reason’s own criterion (e.g.,
O’Neill ).
 Translations are my own, but I have beneﬁted from the translations available in the Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
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Humanity as End in Itself, and the third is the Formula of Autonomy,
which Kant subsequently develops into the Formula of the Realm of Ends
(cf. G :, , , , , ). With the third, Kant introduces an
analogy with political legislation. He initially refers to this formulation as
“the third” principle, but towards the end of his discussion he labels it the
“Principle of Autonomy” (G :). Given that this is where Kant
introduces the notion of autonomy, the political analogy at issue in the
third Formula seems to be the natural point on which to focus if we wish
to gain a clearer understanding of this notion.
The “Principle of Autonomy,” Kant writes, is the “idea of the will of
every rational being as a will giving universal law” (G :). Kant also
formulates it as the “principle of every human will as a will that is
universally legislating through all its maxims” (G :; original emphasis).
It is the command to “regard” oneself as giving universal laws through
one’s maxims, for the purposes of evaluating oneself and one’s actions (cf.
G :). In imperatival form, it reads as follows: “act as if your maxim
were to serve at the same time as a universal law (of all rational beings)”
(G :).
These formulations raise a number of questions. The ﬁrst concerns the
nature and content of the universal legislation at issue. Does the “universal
law” of which Kant speaks here refer to the principle of morality (Categor-
ical Imperative) or to substantive moral laws (duties), such as the law that
one ought not to lie (cf. G :) and the “law to promote the happiness
of others” (KpV :)? The second question is why Kant would refer to
the principle as the principle “of autonomy” at all. “Autonomy” does not
appear in the formulation of the principle, nor does it include any explicit
reference to the self. Instead, the principle emphasizes giving universal law.
Why does Kant call this autonomy?
Given that Kant explicitly presents the Principle of Autonomy as an
analogy, I will begin by examining the set of ideas that serves as the
basis of the analogy in order to see what clues this yields when it comes
to answering the above questions. I therefore turn to the political
theory Kant defended during the very months in which he was writing
the Groundwork. I ﬁrst provide some of the relevant background infor-
mation about the Feyerabend lectures (Section ). Following a brief
introduction of Kant’s notion of analogy (Section ), I show that his
conception of moral autonomy has close parallels in his account of just
political legislation – parallels that are crucial for understanding his
Groundwork conception of moral autonomy. I focus on Kant’s two-
tiered conception of political and moral legislation to determine the
  
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nature of the law at issue (Section ). I then consider the sense in
which this law is self-legislated (Section ). In the ﬁnal section, I show
how this analysis of Kant’s “Principle of Autonomy” can help us to
understand what Kant means when he designates autonomy as a
“property” of the will (Section ).
. The Feyerabend Lectures: A Neglected Resource for
Understanding the Groundwork
As the standard picture has it, Kant developed his conception of
moral autonomy in the Groundwork on the basis of the political
conception of autonomy that Jean-Jacques Rousseau had developed in
The Social Contract. Kant’s publication record might seem to provide
support for this thesis, since he did not publish any detailed and
systematic discussions of legal and political philosophy of his own until
the s.
However, this standard picture entirely overlooks the fact that Kant was
lecturing on legal and political theory while he was writing the Ground-
work. It is no coincidence that his very ﬁrst documented public reference
to the idea of moral autonomy is found in the introduction to the
 Feyerabend lectures. More importantly, Kant’s account of moral
autonomy parallels his own account of just political legislation (and more
closely than it does Rousseau’s).
Kant taught this course during the Summer Semester of , from
April  to September . This was the very period in which he was
writing the Groundwork. A letter from Johann Georg Hamann, dated
April , , reports that Kant was working on a “precursor” to his
moral theory (“Prodromus der Moral”). Another letter from Hamann,
dated September –, , reports that Kant had sent the manuscript
to the publisher.
 For further discussion of Kant’s reference to autonomy in the Introduction to the Feyerabend
lectures, see Marcus Willaschek’s essay in Chapter  of this volume.
 The manuscript states that the lectures were held during the winter semester, but the lectures were
actually held during the summer semester. This mistake seems to be attributable to the copyist (see
Gerhard Lehmann’s introduction to the Academy Edition of the Feyerabend lectures, AA :).
 At this point, Kant had been working on a book on moral philosophy for some time. In the
Vorarbeiten for the Prolegomena (), he writes that he will soon present the solution to the
problem of the possibility of the Categorical Imperative (cf. AA :). Initially, however, he had
been planning to write a critical discussion of a work by Garve. In the spring of , it seems, the
project transformed into the project of the Groundwork. See Paul Menzer’s introduction to the
Groundwork in the Academy Edition, AA :f.
 Both letters are quoted in Menzer’s introduction, at AA : and AA : respectively.
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This suggests that the standard account of the emergence of Kant’s
notion of moral autonomy needs revising. Rather than assuming that Kant
borrowed the notion of autonomy from Rousseau in the absence of any
developed political theory of his own, we should examine his notion of
moral autonomy in light of his own political theory.
The Feyerabend lectures are the only available student transcript of
Kant’s lectures on natural law, despite the fact that he taught the course
 times between  and . The transcript was rediscovered in the
s and was then hastily included in the Academy Edition as an
appendix to the  volume that contained Kant’s lectures on moral
philosophy. Their inconspicuous location, the absence of scholarly appar-
atus, the edition’s reputation as being unreliable, and the fact that there is
still no translation of the Latin textbook that Kant assigned for this course –
Gottfried Achenwall’s Ius Naturae (Achenwall ) – all help to explain
why these lectures have received relatively little attention in the world of
Kant scholarship. This may soon change, thanks to the recent critical
edition by Delfosse, Hinske, and Sadun Bordoni (, ), the publi-
cation of an English translation by Frederick Rauscher (), and the
forthcoming English translation of Achenwall’s textbook (Achenwall
[forthcoming]). Of course, there is good reason to use caution when
taking a student transcript as a basis for reconstructing Kant’s own views.
As becomes clear below, however, Kant’s own notes and published texts
from the same period provide independent conﬁrmation of the accuracy of
the transcript. For example, he defends the same views in the essay “What
is Enlightenment?,” which he ﬁnished only weeks after he had completed
the Groundwork manuscript.
 To recommend that we read Kant’s conception of moral autonomy in light of his own political
theory is not to deny or diminish Rousseau’s importance for Kant, of course, since Kant’s political
philosophy itself owes a considerable debt to Rousseau.
 On Achenwall’s textbook and Kant’s use of it, see Byrd and Hruschka :–.
 Notable exceptions include Hirsch  on Kant’s legal philosophy in the Feyerabend lectures and
its relation to the Metaphysics of Morals; Guyer on Kant’s discussion of freedom in the introduction
to the Feyerabend lectures (e.g., Guyer ); Zöller  on the notions of bindingness and
obligation; and Rauscher  on Kant’s conception of sovereignty in relation to his later
assessment of the French Revolution.
 In the volume of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant titled Lectures and Drafts
on Political Philosophy, eds. Frederick Rauscher and Kenneth Westphal.
 There is a German translation of Achenwall and Pütter  [], but this edition diﬀers
substantially from the  edition assigned by Kant for his lectures.
 Kant dates the essay September ,  (WA :).
  
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. Analogies
Analogies play a very important role in Kant’s philosophical work, in part
because he regards them as indispensable for “representing” ideas or
principles of reason. Unlike empirical concepts, for which one can give
examples, and unlike concepts of the understanding, for which one can
give schemas, ideas and principles of reason cannot be directly represented
by sensible intuition. The only way to represent ideas and principles of
reason is indirectly, via analogy (cf. Prol :–; KU :–).
Kant’s use of analogies for representing rational ideas and principles, then,
should not be misunderstood as a mere use of decorative metaphors to
enliven his audience’s reading experience. Rather, their use has the more
important function of presenting in concreto what is meant by the idea or
principle in the ﬁrst place (cf. Kleingeld ).
Kant reﬂects on the methodological aspects of his use of analogy in
relation to the idea of God, in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. He writes that an analogy “does
not signify, as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity of two
things, but a perfect similarity of two relations between entirely dissimilar
things” (Prol :, emphasis added). Thus, in the case of the a priori idea
of God, Kant argues that the nature of reason is such that we regard the
sensible world as standing in a relation that is similar to the relation
between a watch and its maker, a ship and its builder, and a regiment
and its commander (cf. Prol :). In other words, we are rationally
compelled to regard the sensible world as if it had been ordered by a
supreme being. Positing an analogy between God and a watchmaker in
this way does not amount to saying that God is similar to a watchmaker,
nor does it mean that we must believe that God exists or that the world was
indeed created by God. Rather, what it means is that we proceed, when
investigating nature, in the manner in which we would proceed if we knew
the world had been created by God. In the case of natural science, it means
that we proceed as if nature had a rational order, and Kant traces our
tendency to do so to the a priori idea of God. Our use of this idea involves
“regarding” the world “as if” it were a systematic unity – that is, “as if it
were the work of a highest intelligence and will” (Prol :; cf. KrV
A/B).
In the Groundwork, Kant uses the same terminology of “regarding as”
and “acting as if” when he claims that the diﬀerent formulations of the
Categorical Imperative involve the use of analogy. He also motivates his
reformulation of the Categorical Imperative in the diﬀerent formulas by
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saying that these are diﬀerent ways to “represent” the principle of morality
and “bring an idea of reason closer to intuition” and thereby closer to
feeling (G :). In the case of the Principle of Autonomy, he argues that
we are to “regard” (ansehen, betrachten) ourselves as giving universal laws
through our maxims, or that we are to “act as if” we are (G :, ). All
of this suggests that we should indeed interpret the Principle of Autonomy
as involving the use of analogy in Kant’s technical sense.
. Kant’s Two-Tiered Conception of Law in
Politics and Morality
To determine what Kant means by the “universal law” mentioned in the
Principle of Autonomy, we need to understand his account of political
legislation. I ﬁrst discuss the relevant aspects of his  account of
political legislation before comparing these to Kant’s discussion of the
Principle of Autonomy. In particular, I argue that the relation between
the Categorical Imperative and the “universal law” mentioned in the
Principle of Autonomy (as described in the Groundwork) parallels the
relation between the a priori constitutional law of the state and positive
state laws (as described in the Feyerabend lectures).
A. A Two-Tiered Conception of Political Law
In the Feyerabend lectures, Kant argues that the aim of the state as such is
not the general happiness but a general condition of justice (Gerechtigkeit),
which he also calls a condition of “public freedom” (NF :). As he
also puts it, “right concerns freedom” (NF :). Hence, the condi-
tion of freedom is to be brought about through just state legislation: “The
state of a republic [status rei publicae] is thus freedom and more speciﬁcally
public freedom, and this must be the aim of the highest ruler [imperantis
summi]” (NF :).
Kant argues that the leading normative principle for achieving justice
or public freedom is the a priori idea of an original contract. The state is
to be regarded as having originated in the agreement of the people to
 Given Kant’s claims that women are unﬁt for full citizenship, and that they are inferior to men due
to certain cognitive “deﬁciencies” (Anth :–; cf. -), it would be misleading to use
explicitly gender-inclusive language in this description of his theory. For discussion of the
diﬃculties raised by Kant’s use of gender-neutral terminology such as “human being” in
combination with his description of women as naturally inferior to men, see Kleingeld .
  
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subject themselves to common legislation (cf. NF :). The terms
of this ideal contract are the a priori constitutional principles of the
state. Any positive legislation therefore ought to be consistent with this
idea of an original contract to which all subjects are party. Importantly,
Kant asserts that this implies that any positive state legislation ought to
be such that it could have proceeded from the agreement of the entire
people.
The contract terminology might be taken to suggest that an act of
signing took place and that the state is constituted by a historical event,
but Kant emphatically denies that the civil condition must be conceived as
stemming “from a deed” (vom facto) (NF :). Rather, the idea of an
original contract is an idea of reason, a rational normative principle: “An
original contract, which is an idea that lies necessarily in reason, forms the
basis of all civil associations” (NF :). Thus, one ought to “regard”
or “represent” the state as originating in an original contract (NF :),
without assuming that it is actually the result of a historical decision by all
to constitute a state. Rather, the relation between state laws and citizens
should be conceived on the model of the relation between a contract and its
signatories.
Accordingly, Kant is reported to have said that all positive legislation
within the state ought to proceed on the principle that only those laws that
could have been adopted by the people as a whole are just:
One must represent all laws in a civil society as given through the vote
[Stimmung] of all. The original contract [contractus originarius] is an idea of
the consent of all that has become a law for them. One must examine
whether the law could have arisen from the agreement of all: if so, then the
law is right [richtig]. (NF :)
Thus, the normative constitutional principle requires neither that the
people actually consent to the laws nor that they would consent if asked. It
merely requires that the people could consent to them. The legislator ought to
proceed by asking whether candidate laws can be regarded as if they
stemmed from the “will of all” and ought only to give laws that pass this test.
The criterion governing whether a law can stem from the will of all is
whether the law is indeed genuinely universal. In the margin of his own copy
of the textbook he assigned for the course, Kant wrote: “All laws of the highest
 Note that the Feyerabend lectures predate the written constitutions of the US and France that were
adopted by the citizens and stemmed “from a deed,” so to speak.
 Clearly, this is yet another context in which Kant uses analogy.
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ruler [des summi imperantis] must originate as if from common agreement
[qvasi ex consensu communi], namely, they should not necessarily contradict
it . . . If laws are possible only on the basis of a private choice [ex arbitrio
privato] (one against all), they are violent, and therefore despotic” (:,
emphasis in original).
In the Feyerabend lectures, Kant provides an example of unjust legisla-
tion, namely, the example of a ruler who imposes taxes on merchants while
exempting his favorites from this burden (cf. NF :). The example is
not developed in any detail, but its point seems to be that this law is not
genuinely universal because it comes with a decidedly private exception
motivated by the ruler’s personal preferences.
To sum up: according to Kant’s account as we ﬁnd it in the Feyerabend
lectures, the most fundamental, constitutional law of the state is an a priori
idea of reason. It articulates a procedural normative principle for determin-
ing whether positive laws are just, namely the idea of an original contract
to which all subjects are signatories. According to this principle, only those
positive state laws that could have been given by the entire people are just.
In order to qualify as such, a law should not allow for private exceptions
and must be genuinely universal.
B. A Two-Tiered Conception of Moral Law
The parallels between this two-tiered account of political legislation and its
moral counterpart in the Groundwork are striking. The Principle of
Autonomy is itself an alternative formulation of the Categorical Impera-
tive, which functions as an analogue of the political “constitutional” or
“fundamental law.” It demands that the moral agent act as if he were a
legislator of universal laws, which are conceived as analogous to positive
state laws.
A ﬁrst parallel to note is that in the Feyerabend lectures Kant designates
the constitutional principle as an a priori principle that “lies necessarily in
reason,” and in the Groundwork he similarly refers to the Categorical
Imperative as an a priori principle of pure reason. He refers to the
Categorical Imperative as a “necessary law” that is “fully a priori”
(G :). In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes the parallel
with a constitutional law even more explicit by repeatedly calling the
Categorical Imperative the unconditional and a priori “Grundgesetz” of
pure practical reason (KpV :, ), or the “Grundgesetz” “of a super-
sensible nature” (KpV :). “Grundgesetz” means “constitution,” “consti-
tutional law,” or “fundamental law” (in the sense of lex fundamentalis or
  
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Fundamentalgesetz, cf. NF :). Kant clearly uses the term “Grund-
gesetz” in this sense and with reference to the idea of an original contract.
Elsewhere, he writes, for example: “This fundamental law (Grundgesetz),
which can arise only from the general (united) will of the people, is called
the original contract (ursprünglichen Vertrag)” (TP :). Thus, Kant
refers to the Categorical Imperative using the exact same Grundgesetz
terminology with which he also refers to the constitutional principle of
the state. Moreover, in both the Groundwork and the Feyerabend lectures,
he describes these fundamental laws as a priori principles of reason.
A second parallel is the fact that in the Feyerabend lectures Kant
argues that the constitutional principle should guide and constrain the
political legislator, and in the Groundwork he argues that the Categorical
Imperative should guide and constrain the moral agent who is –
according to the Principle of Autonomy – to regard himself as legislating
through his maxims. When evaluating the moral permissibility of one’s
maxims of action, Kant argues, one should “regard oneself as” giving
universal laws through one’s maxims. The laws one is to consider as
being given “through one’s maxims,” then, are the analogical counter-
parts of positive state laws – namely, the universalized versions of one’s
maxims.
Third, the normative content of the a priori constitutional principle
(according to the Feyerabend lectures) is mirrored in its analogical moral
counterpart. The criterion one ought to observe when evaluating one’s
maxims is formally the same as the criterion governing the legislation of
positive state laws: in both cases, the principle – the candidate maxim or
the proposed state law, respectively – ought to be able to serve as a
genuinely universal law. One should ask oneself whether one’s maxim
can serve not merely as one’s personal maxim but also, simultaneously, as a
universal law for the entire moral realm (cf. G :, , , ). As
 Most translators render Grundgesetz as “fundamental law.” This is certainly not incorrect, given that
the Latin is lex fundamentalis, but for current readers it may obscure the political connotations of
the term and especially the fact that it refers to a constitutional principle.
 Kant’s political theory underwent important changes over the years, and there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in substance between the Feyerabend lectures and “On the Common Saying” from
. Here, I abstract from this developmental aspect and point merely to similarities between the
concepts used. For a discussion of the changes in Kant’s political theory in relation to his conception
of moral autonomy, see Kleingeld .
 The connection between political and moral legislation in Kant’s work is obscured by the fact that
the expressions “allgemeiner Wille” and “allgemeines Gesetz” are usually rendered “general will” and
“general law” in translations of his political philosophy, and as “universal will” and “universal law”
in translations of his moral works.
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mentioned above, the moral imperative is as follows: “Act as if your maxim
were to serve at the same time as a universal law (of all rational beings)”
(G :).
As indicated by the “as if” in the quoted passage, Kant does not argue
that one does or should in fact literally legislate universal laws through
one’s maxims. Rather, one is to regard oneself as if this were so, for the
purposes of evaluating the moral permissibility of one’s maxims. Each
rational being “must regard himself as giving universal law through all
the maxims of his will, in order to evaluate (beurteilen) himself and his
actions from this point of view” (G :). The moral agent is not
required literally to give laws but rather to determine the permissibility
of his maxims by using the model for evaluating the justice of
state laws.
Above, I quoted Kant as speaking of a “contradiction” that can emerge
between a political legislator’s “private choice” and what can be the object
of “common agreement.” He wrote that laws that are possible only on the
basis of private choice and that cannot be the object of common agree-
ment, are unjust. In the Groundwork, Kant similarly speaks of a “contra-
diction” that ensues in the case of maxims that fail the criterion. This
contradiction emerges during moral reﬂection, when one examines – as the
Principle of Autonomy requires that one do – whether one’s action
principles can serve both as one’s own (private) maxims and simultan-
eously as universal laws. If they cannot (without contradiction), then
acting on these maxims is morally impermissible.
Before I turn to the sense in which the legislative process, thus
described, can be designated as “autonomy,” let me sum up the results
thus far. First, both the political and the moral “constitutional laws” are a
priori principles of pure practical reason; neither is the product of positive
legislation. Or, more precisely, since the moral principle involves the
analogous use of the political constitutional principle, a single a priori
formal normative principle governs both domains. Second, the “universal
laws” that the moral agent is to regard himself as giving, under the
normative guidance of this constitutional principle, are substantive laws
for the entire moral realm; they are conceived on analogy with the positive
laws given by a political legislator.
 For a detailed interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law along these lines, with an emphasis on
Kant’s conception of the nature of the contradiction involved, see Kleingeld .
  
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. Autonomy in Politics and Morality
A. Political Autonomy in the Feyerabend Lectures
Why does Kant call the third alternate formulation of the Categorical
Imperative the Principle of Autonomy? More speciﬁcally, in what sense can
we speak of self-legislation in a moral context? To shed more light on these
issues, I shall examine in more detail whether and in what sense political
laws are (or ought to be) “self-given” according to the Feyerabend lectures.
In the  Feyerabend lectures and in published texts from the same
year, Kant does not recommend, let alone argue that it is normatively
required, that political legislation take the form of actual self-legislation
by the people. Although he asserts that the people are sovereign and that
the highest legislation resides with those who obey the law (cf.
NF :f ), he calls this an “idea” and argues that actual legislation
may be undertaken by the people’s representative (cf. NF :). Kant
does not argue that this representative must be elected by the people; it
may be an unelected sovereign ruler. In other words, Kant does not
argue that citizens ought to have the right to vote and (directly or
indirectly, via elected representatives) actually legislate in any literal
sense. Although he allows for political systems that include actual (self-)
legislation by the citizens (cf. NF :), Kant does not maintain that
the latter is a necessary condition for achieving political justice or public
freedom.
Instead, Kant argues that the sovereignty of the people requires that a
highest legislator who represents them ought to give only laws that the
entire people could agree to (or could have agreed to): “That government is
always good in which laws are given that the entire people could have given”
(NF :; emphasis added). The people’s self-legislation is an idea that
functions as a normative criterion that should be used by any legislator who
acts as their representative. Acting as their representative, the legislator
ought to restrict legislation to laws that a people could make, not to laws
that they would make (if given the opportunity) or to which they do agree.
The citizen “is being regarded as if he were governed in accordance with his
own will” (NF :; emphasis added). Kant reportedly even said the
following in his lectures: “The laws of a despot can be just, when they have
been made such that they could have been made by the entire people . . . It
is not necessary for him to judge whether the people would make such a law
in this case, but whether it could have made such a law” (NF :;
emphasis added).
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Kant should not be misunderstood as recommending despotism here,
but his claim that the normative principle governing legislation abstracts
entirely from the actual will of the people does indeed have the implication
that a despot’s laws can be fully just. The criterion Kant formulates does
not require actual legislation by the people themselves. It does not
require that the despot consult the people; it does not even require that
the despot ask himself whether the people would enact a certain law. All
that is necessary is that the people could do so. The idea of citizen self-
legislation, or the idea of the autonomy of the people, functions as a
normative criterion.
There is no reason to believe that Feyerabend misunderstood Kant on
this count. Kant defends the same position in his notes and in published
writings from the same period. Above, I quoted Kant’s note that “All laws
of the highest ruler must originate as if from common agreement”
(Remarks on Achenwall, AA :). Moreover, in “What is
Enlightenment?,” which Kant ﬁnished soon after he had completed the
manuscript of the Groundwork, he writes: “The touchstone of whatever
can be decided upon as law for a people lies in the question: whether a
people could impose such a law upon itself” (WA :; emphasis added).
In sum, according to the political theory Kant defended in , it is not
necessary for the people to actually legislate; the ruler, as their representa-
tive, is to give laws that they could have given themselves.
B. Moral Autonomy: As If We Were Legislating
If we now turn to the Principle of Autonomy, we recognize the features of
this counterfactual conception of citizen autonomy. As Kant writes in the
Groundwork, the will is to be “regarded” as “universally legislating through
all its maxims” (G :), and the moral agent is to “act as if,” through his
maxims, he were giving universal laws – that is, laws that are to serve as
laws “of all rational beings” (G :). Nowhere does Kant suggest that all
rational beings who are regarded as subject to these laws must give their
consent. Kant does mention that we should take into account the
 One exception seems to be the passage where Kant is reported as stating that “every law that does
not originate in consent is unjust” (NF :). Yet Kant is here still explicating the idea of the
original contract. In the subsequent sentence he concludes his discussion of this idea, and then he
immediately continues by saying that the laws of a despot can be just.
 The word Kant uses is “über” (about): the decision is “about” the people. See also WA :f, again
in the context of legislation: “But what a people may not even decide about itself, a monarch may
decide even less about the people.”
  
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perspective of all others (G :, ), but the way in which we are to
satisfy this requirement is simply by asking whether our maxim can
simultaneously serve as a universal law. He does not claim that we must
take into consideration the actual attitudes of others towards our maxims
or that we must engage in joint deliberation. The agent who regards
himself as legislating universal law through maxims, then, seems to be
the moral analogue of the political legislator who ought only to give laws
that the people (as a political entity) could impose upon themselves.
Importantly, the moral agent is to regard himself as giving universal
law – that is, as giving law to all. In the literature on Kant’s ethics,
autonomy is often understood as “giving law to oneself,” but this is a
somewhat misleading way of putting it. A political legislator does not give
laws only or primarily to himself but to the entire people; Kant’s analogical
description of the moral agent is not as someone whose primary concern is
giving law to himself but as someone whose primary concern is giving
law to the entire moral community. In fact, there is not a single passage in
the Groundwork in which Kant writes unambiguously, in so many words,
that one is to regard one’s will as giving laws “to itself” or that the moral
agent ought to act as if he were giving laws “to himself” as an individual
(except in negative formulations and in translations; see below).
Of course, genuinely universal legislation eo ipso also applies to oneself.
There is an obvious aspect of reﬂexivity implied in the idea of giving
universal law, and Kant states very explicitly that this is how he conceives
of it in the moral case. All humans, as ﬁnite rational beings, should regard
themselves not merely as lawgiving but also as subject to the laws they
regard themselves as giving. They should ask whether their maxims qualify
as “universal legislation (to which [the rational being] simultaneously
subjects itself )” (G :f ). The will is conceived as giving universal
law, “although with the condition of simultaneously being itself subject
to this very legislation” (G :).
Kant contrasts this position of the moral agent as a legislating “member”
of the moral realm with the position of its “head.” A member is subject to
the laws the member gives, whereas a head is not. In order to qualify as a
head, however, one needs to be “a completely independent being, without
need and limitation of a power adequate to its will.” In the moral realm,
Kant asserts, only God satisﬁes these conditions (cf. G :).
 Although Kant usually uses the term “Oberhaupt” to refer to the head of the executive, he also uses
it to refer to an authority with legislative powers, e.g., when he argues that we must conceive of God
as the “legislating head in a moral realm of ends” at KU :.
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It is not entirely clear from Kant’s discussion, however, whether he
conceives of the position of the moral agent as analogous to the position of
the political ruler or as analogous to the position of the political subject in a
just state who is governed “as if” the laws stemmed from his own law-
giving. A passage in the Mrongovius II lectures, which Kant gave in the
winter semester of –, seems to suggest the second alternative: “I
can also picture (mir vorstellen) a realm of ends with autonomy . . . In this
realm we regard (betrachten) ourselves as those who obey the law, but also
as those who give the laws. God is the supreme lawgiver” (M II :).
This passage seems to indicate that in the moral realm of ends the
position analogous to that of the political lawgiver (as outlined in the
Feyerabend lectures) is actually taken up by God. Members of the realm of
ends then seem to be the analogues of subjects in the political state who
cannot take any active part in legislation but who should “regard” them-
selves as being governed in accordance with their own legislation. These
subjects are “represented” or “pictured” as having autonomy. On the other
hand, in the Groundwork Kant writes that “every rational being must act as
if he were, through his maxims, at all times a lawgiving member in a
universal realm of ends” (G :), and the fact that they are to act as if
they are lawgiving seems to suggest that Kant conceives of these members
as direct analogues of the ruler (and not merely as governed as if they were
legislating).
For our understanding of Kant’s Principle of Autonomy, however, it
is not necessary to examine this interpretive diﬃculty in more detail
here. Whether the moral agent regards himself on analogy with a
political legislator subject to his own laws or on analogy with a mere
“member” subject to laws the member could have given, this makes no
diﬀerence for the purposes of determining the moral permissibility of
his maxims. The agent is to “regard” himself as giving universal laws,
through his maxims, to the entire moral community, including the
agent himself.
This is what matters for our understanding of Kant’s notion of auton-
omy, and it explains why Kant refers to the principle as the principle “of
autonomy.” “Autonomy” means being subject to laws that are one’s own,
as opposed to laws one is given by another (heteronomy). The third
Formula is the “Principle of Autonomy” in the sense that one is to regard
oneself as giving universal laws and as being subject to these laws – that is,
as being subject to one’s own laws. Kant also expresses this idea in a
famous passage in which he explains what he means by the “idea of the will
of every rational being as a universally legislating will”:
  
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In accordance with this principle, all maxims are rejected that cannot
coexist with the will’s own universal legislation. The will is thus not merely
subject to the law, but subject in such a way that it must also be viewed as
self-legislating [selbstgesetzgebend] and precisely for that reason subject to the
law in the ﬁrst place (of which it can regard itself as author [Urheber]).
(G :)
The term “selbstgesetzgebend” in this passage is often translated as “legislat-
ing to itself” or “giving the law to itself.” We can now appreciate,
however, that it is better translated as “self-legislating” or “itself legislat-
ing.” In this passage, Kant claims that for the purposes of determining
whether the maxims of one’s will are morally permissible, one should view
the will as legislating universal laws (through its maxims) to which the will
is itself subject. In other words, the will is viewed as subject to universal
laws that have been given by the will itself rather than having been imposed
heteronomously, by another authority. This reading of the passage is
conﬁrmed by the fact that Kant also uses “itself . . . legislating” to express
the same idea (two words, selbst gesetzgebend instead of selbstgesetzgebend)
(G :). We ﬁnd further support for this reading in the many passages
in which Kant refers to the universal law as “springing from” the will or as
being the will’s “own” law (G :–). The “self” in “self-legislating,”
then, indicates that the legislation is regarded as originating in the self, not
that it is only or primarily addressed to the individual self. Qua universal
law, it is a law addressed to all rational beings.
We are now in a position to appreciate why it was possible for Kant to
regard the legislation analogy as apt for use in his moral theory. Autonomy
consists in being subject to laws given by oneself. It is opposed to
heteronomy, which consists in being subject to a law given by another.
Kant calls the third alternative formulation of the Categorical Imperative
the Principle of Autonomy because it enjoins agents to regard themselves as
giving universal laws, through their maxims, to which they are themselves
subject.
The Principle of Autonomy does not demand that one actually give
moral laws. It involves the use of a legislation analogy by which Kant
articulates a procedure for testing the moral permissibility of one’s maxims.
Understood in this way, his use of the idea of autonomy does not have
 For a detailed argument to the eﬀect that “the law” in the quoted passage is one’s maxim conceived
as universal law, and not the Moral Law (Categorical Imperative), see Kleingeld and Willaschek
(unpublished).
 See the Groundwork translations by Allen Wood and Mary Gregor. In a footnote, Gregor mentions
“as itself lawgiving” as an alternative translation.
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voluntaristic implications: in no way does it imply that the content or
obligatory force of moral laws is dependent on an act of the agent or on
anyone’s actual consent. By extension, it does not imply that the agent can
rescind moral laws.
. From Principle to Property
In formulating the Principle of Autonomy, Kant makes analogical use of
the idea of political autonomy, as part of a counterfactual procedure for
determining the moral status of given maxims. In later discussions in the
Groundwork, however, Kant also refers to autonomy as a property of the
will, namely, as “the will’s property of being a law to itself” (G :).
Kant writes: “Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is
a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)”
(G :). In these passages, Kant straightforwardly asserts that the will has
the property of autonomy and that it is a law to itself – not that we should
analogically “regard” it as such.
This understanding of the will as having the property of autonomy
might therefore at ﬁrst sight seem discontinuous with the analogical use of
the idea of autonomy in the context of the discussion of the Principle of
Autonomy. On closer examination, however, the thesis that the will has
the property of autonomy in fact follows from Kant’s account of the
procedure articulated in the Principle of Autonomy. As noted above, he
asserts that the Categorical Imperative (and hence also the Principle of
Autonomy as one of its Formulas) is an a priori principle of reason.
Moreover, in the Groundwork Kant identiﬁes practical reason and the will
(cf. G :). On these assumptions, it does indeed follow that the will has
autonomy in the sense of being “a law to itself.” For the will is both the a
priori source of the Categorical Imperative and subject to this imperative as
well as to the substantive moral laws established on its basis. Applying the
Categorical Imperative does not require the use of any normative principle
from outside the will itself (such as a principle based on inclination). The
will is therefore subject only to its own laws. Kant emphasizes that moral
laws are “independent from nature,” necessary and a priori, and “grounded
merely in reason” (G :). Therefore Kant can indeed describe the will
as having the “property” of autonomy in the sense of its being subject to its
own laws, without this implying that the obligatory force of moral laws
(and the corresponding duties) derives from a contingent act.
  
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. Conclusion
“Autonomy,” on Kant’s conception of it, means being subject to laws that
are one’s own. According to the Principle of Autonomy, we are to regard
ourselves as giving universal laws through our maxims and as being subject
to these laws ourselves. Kant here uses this legislation analogy to articulate
a procedure for determining whether one’s maxims are morally permis-
sible. In light of the political theory Kant develops in the Feyerabend
lectures, we can understand why it was possible for him to consider this
analogy apt, and why his conception of moral autonomy does not have the
voluntaristic implications often associated with it.
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